We present generic frameworks for constructing efficient broadcast encryption schemes in the subset-cover paradigm, introduced by Naor et al., based on various key derivation techniques. Our frameworks characterize any instantiation completely to its underlying graph decompositions, which are purely combinatorial in nature. These abstract away the security of each instantiated scheme to be guaranteed by the generic one of the frameworks; thus, give flexibilities in designing schemes. Behind these, we present new techniques based on (trapdoor) RSA accumulators utilized to obtain practical performances. We then give some efficient instantiations from the frameworks, via a new structure called subset-incremental-chain. Our first construction improves the currently best schemes, including the one proposed by Goodrich et al., without any further assumptions (only pseudo-random generators are used) by some factors. The second instantiation, which is the most efficient, is instantiated based on RSA and directly improves the first scheme. Its ciphertext length is of order O(r), the key size is O(1), and its computational cost is O(n 1/k log 2 n) for any (arbitrary large) constant k; where r and n are the number of revoked users and all users respectively. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first explicit collusion-secure scheme in the literature that achieves both ciphertext size and key size independent of n simultaneously while keeping all other costs efficient, in particular, sub-linear in n. The third scheme improves Gentry and Ramzan's scheme, which itself is more efficient than the above schemes in the aspect of asymptotic computational cost.
Introduction
Broadcast encryption (BE) involves 1 broadcaster and n receivers. Each receiver is given a unique private key. The broadcaster is given a private broadcaster key. The broadcaster wishes to broadcast messages to a designated set P ⊆ N = {1, ..., n} of receivers. Any receivers in P should be able to decrypt the broadcast message using only its private key while a coalition F ⊆ N P (revoked users) should not be able to do so. Such a scheme is motivated largely by pay-TV systems, the distribution of copyrighted materials such as CD/DVD. Broadcast encryption schemes were first formalized by Fiat and Naor [16] . Since then, many variants of the basic problem were proposed. The arguably most challenging variant is the one which considers the case where P can be an arbitrary subset in N while the collusion is considered the full one, N P, and also that the private key stored Manuscript received March 24, 2006 . Manuscript revised July 7, 2006 . Final manuscript received September 1, 2006 . † The author is with the University of Tokyo, Tokyo, 153-8505 Japan.
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a) E-mail: nuts@imailab.iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e90-a. 1.187 by each user is fixed from the initialization time (stateless receiver). The main goal is to construct efficient schemes that satisfy the above variant and require only small size of both the header of broadcast and the private key as a function of n or r := n − |P|. The header is the encapsulation of session key that is used to encrypt data. An efficient solution which is considered a ground work to many consequences is the Complete (binary) Subtree scheme (CS) by Naor et al. [23] . Schemes which were considered the current state of the art (before two very recent works, see below) are: (i) Pseudo-random sequences generator (PRSG) based schemes such as the Subset Difference scheme (SD) [23] , its refinement-the Layered SD scheme (LSD) [17] , and their somewhat generalizations in [4] . (ii) RSA accumulator based schemes such as Asano's scheme [2] , and its optimal generalizations in [3] , [14] . See Table 1 for the efficiency comparison. No scheme above could achieve simultaneously small header size independent of n, small key size of O(log n), while keeping computational cost and all other costs grow only sub-linear in n.
More recently, Goodrich et al. [15] and Wang et al. [26] independently propose more efficient schemes that break the above barrier. In particular, they achieve simultaneously header size of O(r) and key size of O(log n), and computational cost of O(n 1/k ) for arbitrary constant k. (In fact, in [26] only the case when k = 1, 2 is considered).
In this paper, we propose generic frameworks for constructing broadcast encryption and give some efficient instantiations. One of our instantiations (Instantiation 2 in Table 1 ) achieves not only small header size of O(r) but also small key size of O (1) with no extra non-secret storage, while keeping computational cost O(n 1/k log 2 n), which grows only sub-linear in n. Thus this is the first scheme that achieves header and private key size independent of n while keeping computational cost sub-linear in n, with no extra non-secret storage. The contributions in more detail are described below.
Our Contributions
In the general subset-cover paradigm of [23] , which includes almost all of the above schemes, it has been implicitly understood that one can separate the design of such a scheme into two seemingly orthogonal problems namely: designing combinatorial set system which enables subset covering (this step determines the header size), and defining computational key derivation (this step determines the private key Copyright c 2007 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers size and computational cost). This is first explicitly characterized in [14] for the case of Akl-Taylor's RSA based key derivation [1] .
Framework.
In this paper, we characterize the two orthogonal components in general. We then explicitly present three generic sub-frameworks for computational key derivation component (generic as arbitrary set systems are applicable): (1) PRSG based technique (re-formalizing from [4] so as to be consistent with presentations here), (2) non-trapdoor-RSA accumulator based, and (3) trapdoor-RSA accumulator based techniques. The non-trapdoor RSA based one is a generalization and also an optimization of Akl-Taylor's technique. The trapdoor RSA based framework is an extension of the non-trapdoor RSA based one and can achieve better efficiency performance, albeit its description is somewhat more complicated.
The main issue is that we characterize three subframeworks in such a way that such instantiations in these frameworks and their resulting efficiencies will depend solely on properties related to graph decompositions of the set systems being instantiated; while in the same time the security will be guaranteed automatically from the general frameworks. The PRSG based framework will be based on tree decomposition, and the two RSA based frameworks will be based on chain decomposition; both are purely combinatorial. Therefore the whole paradigm abstracts away the computational security issues and reduces the problem to only pure combinatorics. Moreover it allows modularity in designing a scheme: it is a matter of finding a set system which yields a good header size in the first step, and then finding a graph decomposition of that set system that yields a good private key size and computational cost.
As for the generic efficiency characterization, both RSA based frameworks achieve key size of O(1) for all instances. One generic property of the trapdoor based framework that makes it superior to the non-trapdoor based one is that when restricting to the same asymptotic resources and instantiating the same set system † , if the non-trapdoor based one allows n users in the scheme, then the trapdoor based one will allow n k users for any (arbitrary large) constant k. Indeed, the costs due to prime generation are exactly the same (not only asymptotically).
Efficient Instantiations.
For the combinatorial set system component, all of our schemes are based on new set systems we call Subset Incremental chain (SIC) and Layered-SIC (LSIC) which are designed so to achieve small header size as being O(r) while intrinsically have graph decompositions with good properties. For the computational key derivation component, we instantiate the LSIC set system by presenting their graph decompositions, resulting in various concrete schemes upon each sub-framework as follows. We use the notation (X) y to denote an instantiation of the set system X using the ybased framework. Denote LSIC[k] as LSIC with parameter
prsg .
This scheme directly improves the scheme of [15] , [26] (and it is fair to compare with since the same assumption, PRSG, or equivalently one-way function, was used). In particular it can reduce some overheads, albeit only within constant terms in the worst case: the worst-case key sizes are half of those in [15] , [26] . Indeed the key size in our scheme is nonuniform among users; some users are even required to store only constant-size keys (cf. Theorem 4, 6, and Eq. (4)). Our scheme also reduces the computational cost from [15] , but only in the average case (the worst-case costs are asymptotically the same).
Note that (t)acc is for (trapdoor) accumulator. The performance of this scheme is as mentioned previously. It is the first scheme that achieves header and private key size independent of n while keeping computational cost sub-linear in n, with no extra non-secret storage. The number of primes used per user is optimal as being O(log n)
tacc (so that the on-the-fly prime generation cost is O((log 5 n)/k 5 )). Had one used the non-optimal Akl-Taylor's framework as put forth to the context of BE by [2] , [3] , [14] , it would be O(n 1/k log n) which is super-logarithmic (and the prime generation cost would be O(n 1/k log 5 n)).
This scheme improves Gentry and Ramzan's scheme [14] , which itself is more efficient than the above schemes in the aspect of asymptotic computational cost. Our scheme reduces poly-logarithmic cost due to prime generation, which was the dominant cost, to only a constant one without affecting the other parameters. Among the constant-key-size schemes with header size O(r log a (n/r) + r) and no extra non-secret storage, this is the first one in the literature that achieves O(log n) overall computational cost. (And in fact, ours uses only a constant number of primes). The previous improvement for this class of schemes was done by [14] to improve [2] but only in the constant term involving a. (cf. Table 1 ). As a nutshell guide for selecting schemes, if overall good performances are required, the instantiation 2 is recommended; if the computational cost is more restricted, use the instantiation 3; if the underlying cryptographic primitive is restricted to only weak one (namely PRSG, and not RSA or bilinear map), use the instantiation 1. † To be more precise, we indeed do not instantiate the same set system in this comparison; instead, we instantiate a set system, say A, in the non-trapdoor based framework and a hierarchical version of A in the trapdoor based framework. See for more details in Sect. 6.1. 
1.2 Other Related Works
Contemporary Works
At the same time as when we publicly announced our first preliminary version [5] (in January 2005), Boneh et al. [10] presented a public-key broadcast encryption scheme which achieves size O(1) for both header and private key. However, the computational cost is O(n − r) (which, in particular, is not sub-linear in n) and the size of the public key to be used by an encrypter, which is also the non-secret storage needed for the decrypter, is O(n). The second scheme in [10] reduces these computational cost and non-secret storage size to O( √ n) but with the price of the increased header size as O( √ n), which is not independent of n anymore. Also at almost the same time, Jho et al. [20] proposed some efficient schemes with small header size when r is not too small. However, their schemes do not enjoy practical asymptotic performances as either the header size is c 1 r + c 2 n = O(n) (for some constant c 1 , c 2 ) or the key size is [19] ) independently proposed a similar scheme as our instantiation 1, but the private key size is log n + k, which is larger than ours.
Works in Consequence
Consequently after the work in this paper, we further improved our instantiation 1 in [6] (the AI new in Table 1 , presented in November 2005) by applying the PRSG-based framework to the SIC set system, albeit via a new tree decomposition. The resulting scheme trades off the header size and key size via the parameter k. Analogously to the instantiation 1 here, the private key size is non-uniform: it varies from 1 to k(log n + 1).
Independently to our improved scheme, Hwang and Lee [18] (in March 2006) presented a scheme with a similar performance, albeit with the user key size being uniformly k(log n + 1), larger than ours on average.
Finally, it is worth noting that Boneh and Silverberg [9] showed that n-linear maps can be used to construct an optimal public-key scheme with constant private key, public key, and header size. However, there are currently no known constructions for such a map for n > 2.
Organization of the Paper
We first formalize the subset-cover framework separately into two components, combinatorial set system and computational key derivation as mentioned above, in Sect. 2.1. Some terminology is then described in Sect. 2.2. New set systems, SIC and LSIC, are presented in Sect. 3. The three frameworks for key derivation which are PRSG-based, Non-trapdoor RSA accumulators-based, and Trapdoor RSA accumulators-based, are described in Sects. 4.1, 5.1, and 6.1 resp. We then give the instantiations of the proposed set systems in Sects. 4.2, 5.2, and 6.2 from the three frameworks, respectively. We then conclude in Sect. 7.
Framework and Some Preliminaries

Framework
We refer the definitions and the security notions for privatekey broadcast encryption of [23] in Appendix A. Now we formalize the subset-cover framework [23] separately into two independent components as follows.
Combinatorial Set System Component
We first redefine a set system which is useful for such a scheme in this framework called complement-cover set system. Such a set system is a family of subsets of a universe with the property that every subset of the universe can be efficiently partitioned to a union of some collection of subsets in the family. As usual n, r is the number of all users and revoked users respectively. Such a c(n, r)-complement-cover set system yields a broadcast encryption scheme in the subsetcover framework with the header size c(n, r). The scheme is described formally in Appendix C and sketched here as follows. The broadcaster defines a subset key for each subset in the family. Each user stores a set of keys in such a way that he can derive all the keys of subsets (in the family) that he is a member. (Thus, the easiest way to do is to store them all. However to reduce the storage of keys, it would be better to store only some and derive the others from those stored keys on the fly. Such derivation patterns are predefined by the broadcaster.) To revoke the set R of users, the broadcaster just let a header to be a session key encrypted with each key of subsets in the partition of N R. Thus the header size is c(n, r). We often denote c X (n, r) for c(n, r) of the set system S X , where X is the name of that set system.
Computational Key Derivation Component
We formalize the specification on key derivations in the context of access control scheme as the following. Denote by k(S ) the subset key for S ∈ S and p(u) the private key of u ∈ N. Informally, the security of such a scheme requires that with p(u), one can derive k(S ) if and only if u ∈ S ; moreover, the collusion N S cannot derive it. Definition 2 (Access Control Scheme, AC). An Access Control Scheme AC for a set system S over a base set N is a 2-tuple of polynomial-time algorithms (Keygen, Derive) , where:
Takes as input a security parameter 1 λ . It returns all k(S i )'s, all p(u)'s, and public parameter pub. Derive( u, p(u) , S i , pub): Takes as input u ∈ N, the key p(u), S i ∈ S, and pub. It returns k(S i ) if u ∈ S i , or special symbol ⊥ otherwise.
The security notions are formalized as Key-Indistinguishability (following [23] ) and Key-Intract-ability. In what follows, we denote by RR(x, b) the real-or-random oracle, which outputs x if b = 1, otherwise a random string with the same length as x.
Definition 3 (Key-Indistinguishability of AC). An access control scheme AC for a set system S is secure in the sense of Key-Indistinguishability (KIND-1 or KIND-2) if for all polynomial-time randomized adversary A, its advantage
Definition 4 (Key-Intractability of AC). An access control scheme AC for a set system S is secure in the sense of Key-Intractability (KINT-1 or KINT-2) if for all polynomial-time randomized adversary A, its advantage
In Appendix B, we present a simple conversion that converts any KINT-secure scheme to a KIND-secure scheme in the random oracle model. Note that although KIND-2 is seemingly stronger than KIND-1 (since in the former the adversary has a freedom to choose the target subset S * after the corrupt query while the latter does not allow to do so), both notions are indeed obviously equivalent up to polynomial reduction, of factor O(|S|). The same result holds for
KINT.
Naor et al. [23] proved that broadcast encryption in the subset-cover paradigm, which is sketched in Sect. 2.1.1, whose the access control component is secure in the sense of KIND1 is secure in the standard notion, namely IND-CCA1. Without going into detail, we note that either starting with KIND1 or KIND2, the reduction cost to IND-CCA1 of BE is the same (cf. Theorem 15 in Appendix C). Intuitively, this is since the IND-CCA game of BE allows the corrupt query to be asked polynomially many times but both KIND1 and KIND2 allow only once. Therefore, proving KIND2 security is not so interesting in this context. We defined the two adaptivity levels merely for an independent interest.
It is also worth noting that Dodis and Katz [13] use the technique involving multiple encryption to obtain a generic scheme which is IND-CCA2-secure.
Denote (X) y to be the access control scheme for set system S X that is constructed via AC framework y. Denote KeySize (X) y (u) to be the number of keys of u (i.e., |p(u)|, when p(u) is treated as a set) and CompCost (X) y to be the worst-case computational cost for Derive. Also denote PubSize (X) y to be the public storage required exactly in the number of bits. We also refer (X) y as a BE scheme via the complement-cover set system S X . For any y, HeaderSize (X) y (n, r) = c X (n, r).
Some Terminology
Viewing Set system as Poset.
A set system is partially ordered by the inclusion relation (⊂). Interpreting a set system as a partially ordered set (poset) is useful when defining key derivations in AC. Intuitively, Derive algorithm implies that whenever S i ⊂ S j , anyone who can access k(S i ) is allowed to access k(S j ).
Terminology for Posets, Graphs.
The terminology for posets and graphs used in this paper is quite standard one (cf. [12] ) (with some exceptions, see below). Here we review some. A graph is a pair
. V is the set of vertices (or nodes), usually denoted V(G), E is the set of edges, usually denoted E(G). Often, we abuse notation v ∈ G to mean v ∈ V(G).
A tree is a connected acyclic graph. Let x = parent T (y) if x is the parent of a non-root node y in tree T . A directed graph is a pair G = (V, E) of sets satisfying E ⊆ V × V, i.e., an edge is an ordered pair. A directed acyclic graph (DAG) is a directed graph with no directed cycle in it. A notation of chain x → y → z means a directed graph which V = {x, y, z}, E = {(x, y), (y, z)} and is generalized naturally.
An inclusion poset S can be represented by a DAG G by setting V = S, E = {(S , S ) : S ⊂ S ; S, S ∈ S}. This is called the maximal representation, denoted DAG max (S). The minimal representation, denoted DAG min (S), is the one with E = {(S , S ) : S ⊂ c S ; S , S ∈ S} where we say S ⊂ c S iff there is no S ∈ S such that S ⊂ S ⊂ S .
In our context † , a graph decomposition (often denoted G) of a poset S is a family of connected subgraphs whose sets of nodes partition the set of all nodes in the DAG max (S). (Thus we sometimes say G is a graph decomposition of DAG max (S)). When each subgraph is a tree whose edges are directed away from the root, we call it a tree decomposition (often denoted T ). When each graph is a directed chain whose edges are directed in the same direction, we call it a chain decomposition (often denoted C). An induced graph decomposition is one in which each subgraph is an induced subgraph. Figure 1 shows graph decompositions of the set sys- tem for toy example 1, S toy1 = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}, {1, 2, 3}}. From now we abuse some notations, often in figures, e.g., writing 12 or 1, 2 instead of {1, 2} if it causes no confusion. Note that every chain decomposition is a tree decomposition. We will fix BT to be the complete binary tree of n leaves labeled 1, ..., n from left to right. The level of node in BT is the distance from root to it. For a fixed node, its left (resp., right) nodes are those nodes with the same level and appear on the left (resp., right). BT will be used only to help defining set systems and should not be confused with the graph representations of posets of set systems.
New Set Systems
Subset Incremental Chain (SIC) Set System
The SIC Set System.
and (i i) = (i i) := {{i}}. Consider the binary tree BT. For a node v in BT, let l v (resp., r v ) be the leftmost (resp., rightmost) leaf under v. We define the set system SIC (of n users) by letting
where BT L (resp., BT R ) are the set of internal nodes which are left (resp., right) children. An informal visual view of S SIC is shown in Fig. 2 , where the union of all the collections written there is the only important information.
Proof. We call a set of the form {i, i + 1, . . . , j} for some i ≤ j a consecutive set. We first claim that any consecutive set, say A = {i, . . . , j}, can be partitioned to no more than 2 sets in S SIC ; then prove it as follows. Let a be the least common ancestor node of the leaves i and j in BT, denoted lca(i, j) = a. Let s be the least ancestor of a which is in BT L if a ∈ BT R and which is in BT R if a ∈ BT L . Let x, y be the left and right children of a.
We list all possible cases of (i, j) as follows. Let * be an unspecified value. 3.
. . , j}, and we have P, Q ∈ S SIC (since
• lca(i, r x ) = x, thus (i, r x ) will fall to the case 4 and P ∈ S SIC ; • lca(l y , j) = y, thus (l y , j) will fall to the case 3 thus Q ∈ S SIC ).
These proved the claim. Now we are back to the proof, it is obvious that N R can be partitioned to no more than r consecutive sets if 1 or n ∈ R; or to no more than r + 1 such sets otherwise. In the former case, the partition size to sets in S SIC is ≤ 2r; while in the latter case (where {1, ..., s} and {t, ..., n} for some s, t are included in the partition), it is
Intuitively, SIC has graph decompositions with good properties since each collection in the union of Eq. (1) forms a chain of subset. This will become clearer in the next section. The set system LSIC below generalizes SIC.
Layered SIC (LSIC) Set Systems
The LSIC[k] Set System.
We view BT consisting of subtrees (also binary and complete) of n 1/k leaves so that there are exactly k layers of such subtrees, where k| log n. We will call such subtree an "atomic" subtree (to distinguish from other kinds of subtrees in BT). Informally, each atomic subtree contributes sets to S LSIC as in the SIC set system for that subtree, albeit each leaf in the subtree represents all the leaves under it in BT. More formally, for node z in BT, let A z := {l z , l z + 1, ..., r z } (i.e., all the leaves under z). In particular, if z is a leaf then A z = {z} = {l z } = {r z }. Let us consider the leaves u, v in an atomic subtree where v is some node on the right of u. We denote u (+1) , u (+2) (and so on) be the next one, two (and so on) right leaves to u in that atomic subtree. Denote
Let l w , r w be the leftmost and rightmost leaves under w in the atomic subtree and not w itself; for example, l root = a, r root = d and l a = 1, r a = 4 in Fig. 3 . Let A be the set of all nodes which are the roots of atomic subtrees but excluding the root of BT. We define LSIC[k] analogously to Eq. (1) by letting
Observe that each v ∈ A has two collections (l v
) attached since intuitively it is a kind of "root" (i.e., of an atomic subtree) and at a root, the structure of SIC introduces two collections, one for left and one for right direction (cf. Eq. (1) and Fig. 1 ).
Theorem 2. S LSIC[k]
is (2kr)-complement-cover set system for a constant k ; and S LSIC[log a n] is O(r log a (n/r) + r)-complement-cover set system for a constant a.
Note that when k = log a n, from the former claim we already have that S LSIC[log a n] is (2r log a n)-complementcover, but the claim above gives a sharper bound.
Proof. First we will prove that S LSIC[k] is (2kr)-complementcover. Let ST R denote the Steiner tree of a set of leaves R ⊆ N, i.e., the subtree of BT that consists of all paths from the root to each leaf in R. We call a node v special if v ∈ A or v is a leaf in BT. We "color" a node if it is special but is not in ST R and all of its special ancestors are in ST R . Denote C the set of all color nodes. Hence
v∈L j ∩C A v where we denote L j to be the set of all special nodes in the j-th special layer away from root (i.e., at distance j(log n)/k from the root). It suffices to prove that for each special layer j, the set Y j := v∈L j ∩C A v can be partitioned to at most 2r sets in the family S LSIC . Denote x i to be the number of uncolored special nodes in the i-th atomic subtrees from left to right in this j-th layer. From Theorem 1, it is easy to deduce that Y j can be partitioned to at most 2(x 1 + x 2 + · · · + x p ) sets in S LSIC , where p is the last atomic subtree in this layer (in fact, p = n ( j−1)/k ). But we have x 1 + · · · + x p ≤ r since the Steiner tree of r leaves passes through all these uncolored special nodes. This proves the claim.
Next we will prove that S LSIC[log a n] is O(r log a (n/r) + r)-complement-cover. We first give the definition of Stratified Subset-Difference set system with each atomic subtree of a leaves (SSD a ): S SSD a = {A u A v : u is an ancestor of v in the same atomic subtree}. (Note that the name SSD is given in [15] , but is independently presented in [14] ).
It is known [14] that S SSD a is (O(r log a (n/r) + r))-complement-cover. Next, we claim that each A u A v can be partitioned to at most 2 sets in S LSIC[log a n] . Before proving this, we conclude that LSIC[log a n] has c LSIC[log a n] (n, r) = 2c SSD a (n, r) = O(r log a (n/r) + r).
It is left to prove the claim. Let u be an ancestor of v in the same atomic subtree. Thus l u ≤ l v ≤ r v ≤ r u (where the first and the third equalities will not occur simultaneously). 
Key Derivation Based on PRSG
Reformalize the PRSG Based Framework of [4]
Framework Idea (review). In this framework, we use pseudo-random sequence generators to derive keys from one subset to another. The correctness of access control schemes allows this to be done only if the first set is included in the latter (e.g.,{1} ⊂ {1, 2}). Thus such derivations can be defined in correspondence with directed edges in a graph decomposition of DAG max (S), in which all the inclusion relations in S are included. One exception is that there should be no node with indegree > 1 in any graph in the decomposition since it would imply a collision of PRSG, which should be computable by neither broadcasters nor adversaries. Therefore, all the valid decompositions are tree decompositions, of which the class includes all graph decompositions of the poset that allow indegree ≤ 1 for all nodes. Each user then stores keys for subsets which he is in and are closest to the root of that tree. For the toy example 1 in Fig. 1 , our paradigm with the tree decomposition in the figure namely T toy1 allows the user 2 to store only the keys at 2, 24.
Note that in order to be provably secure in the KIND sense, it is mandatory to make an adaptation so that keys are not derived from another key directly. Instead, one should use intermediate keys denoted t(S ) for S ∈ S; how to use this is explained in the construction. This was neglected in many recent schemes that use similar one-way derivation approaches.
The Construction (X)
This is based solely on a tree decomposition, say T , of the poset S X . The scheme applies to an arbitrary complementcover set system X.
Keygen : (Subset keys) At the root S of a tree in T , let t(S ) ← {0, 1} λ . For each node S (either root or nonroot of a tree in T ) whose all children are S i 1 , ..., S i d where d is the outdegree of S , we define the following recurrence relation:
where
For u ∈ N, we define its key as
Derive : Find the tree where S is in and then use Eq. (3) to derive k(S ).
Characterizing Efficiency.
Let RN T (u) = |{S | u ∈ S ; u parent G (S ), G ∈ T }| and call it the reachability number of u in T (since it is the minimal number of sufficient nodes such that when traversing from these nodes in the edge direction we meet all S ∈ S such that u ∈ S ). Let DD T = the depth of the deepest trees. We have
Theorem 3. ([4]) (X)
prsg is secure in the sense of KIND assuming secure PRSG.
PRSG Based Instantiation for SIC, LSIC
Instantiating SIC.
It suffices to define a tree decomposition of S SIC and the concrete scheme will follow automatically from the general construction of the framework. We choose the following natural one and prove that it is the optimal decomposition for SIC. For i ≤ j ∈ N, define graphs
We will use the following tree decomposition.
Let x denotes the binary representation of x. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.
The tree decomposition T SIC yields minimal max u∈N RN T (u), indeed we have
where f (y) := the number of the same consecutive least significant bits of y. In particular, max u∈N RN T SIC (u) = log n+1. We also have DD T SIC = n − 1.
)} can be proved to be a pairwise non-intersecting family (somewhat straightforwardly). Next we prove the formula for RN T SIC (u). For u ∈ N {1}, only possible trees in T SIC that u appears are those graphs G(F v ) for internal nodes v on the path from the leaf u to the root in BT, and G(1 n), G(2 n). Each graph G(·) that u appears contribute one key for u. Thus RN T SIC (u) is at most (log n − 1)+2. Let u, w 1 , ..., w log n , root be the nodes on that path. Due to symmetry, we assume w.l.o.g. that w 1 , ..., w z−1 ∈ BT L and w z ∈ BT R . Now it is easy to see that
thus u does not appear in these graphs. 2. For j = z, we have G(F w j ) = G(l w z r w z − 1) thus u appears in these graph. 3. For z < j ≤ log n, we have that u appears in G(F w j ) since l w j < u < r w j .
We also have that
as desired. Now we prove that T SIC is optimal (obtaining minimal (max u∈N RN T (u)) among all T of SIC). Observe that for all T of SIC, u∈N RN T (u) = S ∈S SIC |{u : u ∈ S , u parent G (S ), G ∈ T }| ≥ |S SIC | = n log n + 1. Hence max u∈N RN T (u) ≥ n log n+1 n = log n + 1. Our decomposition matches this bound.
The number of keys at each user is not uniform as recorded in the corollary below. While sharing some similarities with our scheme, the basic schemes in [15] , [26] assign one-way chains in both left and right directions at each node in BT while we use only one direction and exploit some symmetries. This can be an intuition as to why we can reduce key size at least 2 times (and up to log n in the best case, user 1). Those schemes can be considered as instantiations in our framework, but with storage-redundancies in the sense that the set systems extracted from their schemes are sets with repetition. Moreover, the scheme of [15] can also be shown to be derivation-redundant when exposed in our framework.
Corollary 5. In the scheme (SIC)
prsg , there are exactly 2
x users who store exactly x + 2 keys for 0 ≤ x ≤ (log n) − 1 and exactly 1 user who stores 1 key.
Instantiating LSIC.
Before describing our default tree decomposition of S LSIC , denoted T LSIC[k] , we first describe a more straightforward one, denoted T LSIC[k] , which is constructed, informally, as the union of all T SIC applied to each atomic subtree in BT.
More formally, we can define G(u v) for u, v which are leaves in the same atomic subtree, analogously as before, by letting 
where x is some right node of l v . (Here, '→' means to connect the chains). The definition forḠ(x r v ) for v ∈ BT L ∪{root} can be done analogously. Now we define
The abstraction of this decomposition may disguise the simplicity of the scheme; in Fig. 4 we thus give an explicit example when n = 16 and k = 2 (cf. Fig. 3) .
The following theorem and corollary can be proved by an elementary counting argument based on Theorem 4.
Theorem 6. The tree decomposition T LSIC[k] yields
where we parse x , with padding of 0s on the left so to have length log n bits, as x 1 || · · · || x k so that each x i has length (log n)/k bits; b j is the least significant bit of x j . In particular, max u∈N RN T LSIC[k] (u) = log n + 1. We also have
As an example, user 4 will store 2 keys: k(1234), k(4) (see Fig. 4 ). This can be calculated as |p (4) 
Corollary 7. In (LSIC[k])
prsg , exactly
x−1− j users store exactly x keys for 2 ≤ x ≤ (log n) + 1 and exactly 1 user stores 1 key where C(a, b, c) is the number of integer compositions (ordered partitions) of a into b positive integers, each ≤ c † .
Key Derivation Based on Non-trapdoor RSA
The New Non-trapdoor RSA Based Framework
Framework Idea. We first briefly review the access control scheme of Akl-Taylor [1] . There, each S ∈ S is assigned a publicly known prime.
The key of S is defined as k(S ) = s T :S T p T modulo an RSA modulus, where s is a secret; and S T means (S , T ) is not an edge in DAG max (S). Each user u just stores k({u}).
The terms in the exponents are arranged so that even any collusion cannot compute keys that are not supposed to be computable by them. However, the number of primes used in the above schemes are too large as |S|. Such primes will be stored as non-secret storage or derived on-the-fly † † . We propose a new paradigm which makes uses of prime powers so that the number of primes used becomes optimal. We will see shortly that assigning prime powers depends essentially on a chain decomposition of DAG max (S). Indeed, the number of primes used will be exactly the number of chains; and each node in the same chain will correspond to the same prime but with a distinct power. For the toy example 1 in Fig. 1 , our new paradigm with the chain decomposition C toy1 will result in only 5 primes used while the Akl-Taylor's needs 9 primes. We will describe how to assign those powers over primes by an incidence matrix. We formalize the notion of incidence matrices that admit a secure scheme as maximin matrix:
An n × m matrix {a i j } where a i j ∈ Z ≥0 is called a maximin matrix for set system X if for all S ∈ S X , there exists j: 1 ≤ j ≤ m such that max i∈S a i j < min i∈N S a i j . We give a formal treatment of RSA functions as accumulators and our construction first, then explain later.
RSA Accumulators.
We fix a function f : U f × E f → U f to be an RSA function: f(x, e) := x e mod η where η = pq, p = 2p + 1, q = 2q + 1 and p, q, p , q are distinct odd primes. We restrict that U f is the set of quadratic residues and E f is the set of primes not equal to p , q . We say f is generated from an RSA function generator G RSA (1 λ ). The function f is an instance of RSA accumulators, first proposed in [8] , which has a quasi-commutative property: for all x ∈ U f , and e 1 , e 2 ∈ E f , f(f(x, e 1 ), e 2 ) = f(f(x, e 2 ), e 1 ). If E = {e 1 , ..., e h } where each e i ∈ E f , then we denote f(x, E) := f(f(...f(x, e 1 ), ...), e h ). Note that a set E is threaten as a multi-set, where the repetition of members is important. We thus denote a repetition of a member e which occurs t e times as t e e. For example, f(x, {s e 1 , t e 2 }) = x The Construction (X) acc .
Keygen : Run a G RSA to obtain a description of f :
Let pub consist of all p j 's and {a i j }; indeed we let user derive prime p j only when necessary by predetermining the intervals of those primes (see below). Let
for user u ∈ N and set S ∈ S X .
First it is easy to see that the correctness holds: Derive is computable. Next we will give an intuition as to why for each S ∈ S, the collusion of all users from N S cannot compute the key of S . Informally, the best they can do is to obtain the value with the same base s and the exponent term being GCD of all the exponent terms of the keys for users in N S , which is m j=1 p min i∈N S a i j j (by the well-known trick involving using the extended Euclid's algorithm). To be able † For example C(5, 3, 2) = 3 since 5 = 1 + 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 2 = 2 + 2 + 1. The exact formula of C(a, b, c) is quite complicated and is shown in [25] .
† † In the latter, a sequence of integers {x j } is pre-specified by the broadcaster and p i is defined to be the first prime in [x i , x i+1 ); the program to recognize {x j } has negligible size (cf. [2] ). More primes imply more computational cost on-the-fly.
to compute the key of S , it must divide m j=1 p max i∈S a i j j . But this will not happen due to the property of the maximin matrix.
Theorem 8. (X)
acc is KINT-2-secure assuming the strong RSA assumption.
Before proving the theorem we note that the essential property of RSA accumulator to enable the access control mechanism has been already captured into a useful primitive called decomposably-one-way accumulators which is introduced in [3] . We restate its definition and a lemma as the following. We will then return to prove the security of (X) acc based on the notion of accumulators instead of directly proving from the strong RSA assumption.
Definition 5 (dOW Security of Accumulators). ([3]) Let
G be an accumulator generator. We say that G is secure in the sense decomposably one-wayness (dOW) if for all polynomial-time randomized adversary F its success probability Pr[Exp dOW (G, F) = 1] is a negligible function in λ where we define
Lemma 9. ([3])
The RSA function generator G RSA is secure in the sense of dOW assuming the strong RSA assumption.
Now we return to the proof of the theorem.
Proof. (of Theorem 8) Let
A be an adversary which breaks KINT-2 security of X acc with probability . We present an algorithm F which breaks the dOW security of accumulators with equal probability (thus tight reduction). The construction is as follows:
Find Stage. First F find upon input the description desc f of accumulators from the challenger randomly chooses m elements from E f namely p 1 , ..., p m . (m is the number of columns of maximin matrix for the set system X.) It then runs A which consequently output a set of corrupt users C = {i 1 , ..., i z } ⊂ N at once. To provide the answer, F find just outputs to its challenger E k = {a i k j p j : 1 ≤ j ≤ m} for 1 ≤ k ≤ z, and waits for the result while goes to the next stage.
Guess Stage. The adversary F guess , upon a response f(x, E 1 ), ..., f(x, E z ) from the challenger, can now answer to A by just forwarding these values. These perfectly simulate keys for i 1 , ..., i z . A then outputs (S * , k(S * )) where S * ∩ C = ∅. Now F guess just outputs (E * , w) = ({(max i∈S * a i j ) p j : 1 ≤ j ≤ m}, k(S * )). If A wins its game then it must be that w = f(x, E * ). To see that F wins the game, we only have to show that
This follows from the fact that there is j such that max i∈S * a i j < min i∈N S * a i j ≤ min i∈C a i j . (Due to the property of the maximin matrix and that C ⊆ N S * respectively). Consider the element p j , there are min i∈C a i j such elements in the left-hand-side while only max i∈S * a i j such elements in the right-hand-side. Therefore the uninclusion holds.
Constructing a Maximin Matrix.
Consider a chain decomposition
C = {G 1 , ..., G m } of S X . For each chain G j : S 1 → · · · → S l , construct j-th column by letting a i j := ⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩ 0 if i ∈ S 1 w if i ∈ S w+1 S w l otherwise (8)
Proposition 10. The above construction is a maximin matrix. Moreover, C with the minimum number of chains will imply the maximin matrix with the minimum m, the number of all primes used.
Proof. We will prove that the construction by Eq. (8) is a maximin matrix for X. Consider arbitrary S ∈ S, observe that there is a chain G j : S 1 → · · · → S l and some w, 0 ≤ w ≤ l − 1, such that S = S w+1 (since C is a chain decomposition). For all i ∈ S we have 0 ≤ a i j ≤ w by the construction. For all i ∈ N S we have w < a i j also by the construction. This implies max i∈S a i j ≤ w < min i ∈N S a i j which is what we wanted to prove.
To prove the second claim, it is sufficient to prove the converse of the first claim: from any maximin matrix for X one can construct a a chain decomposition in which the number of chains is less than or equal to the number of columns of the matrix. To do this we fix a maximin matrix. We delete some columns so that the existence of a column j for inequality of maximin matrix is unique for each S ∈ S. We then minus all the entries of the matrix by the minimum entry(entries) so that the minimum entry(entries) becomes 0. Note that the modified matrix is still a maximin matrix. Let m be the number of columns. For the j-th column we construct a chain G j : S 1 → · · · → S l by letting S w+1 := {i : a i j ≤ w}. Here G j is indeed a chain since S w ⊂ S w+1 for w ≥ 0. By the definition, for each S ∈ S there is a unique column j such that max i∈S a i j < min i∈N S a i j , thus S = S max i∈S a i j due to our chain construction. Therefore {G j } 1≤ j≤m is indeed a chain decomposition.
Characterizing Efficiency.
We will generate primes on the fly using the technique in [2] (cf. Footnote † † in Sect. 5.1). Without going into detail, this technique requires computational cost O(log 4 P) to generate one prime, and produces each prime of size O(P log P), where P is the number of all primes needed in such a scheme. In our scheme, P = m. Note that only when P = O(1), it is worthless to use this technique; we just store the least P primes (which requires only negligible storage) so the cost for prime generation in this case is O (1) . Using the notation defined earlier, we have that RN C (u) represents the number of chains in C that u appears; and DD C represents the length of the longest chain in C. The number of all chains in C is |C| (and= m). We obtain:
where MC 
The analysis are as follows. The cost of modular exponentiation for computing Derive is logarithm in the exponent term which is
. To determine its complexity, observe that max i∈S a i j = a u j for all but only RN C (u) terms of j due to Eq. (8) and the fact that u appears only RN C (u) chains. Also, observe that max i∈S a i j − a u j ≤ DD C due to Eq. (8) . Each p j is O(m log m), hence has bit length O(log m). Combining these, we get MC acc C (u) as above. The cost for prime-generation above follows from the fact that the number of primes to be generated when deriving keys are RN C (u).
Remark 1.
The MC of our scheme is asymptotically optimal among all non-trapdoor RSA-accumulator based paradigms (if there are any others) since it matches the lower bound in [14] , which states that the optimal MC is of the same order as the number of subsets (in the set system) that one user is in, albeit here we calculate in bit complexity which includes the size of primes.
Remark 2. The Akl-Taylor's scheme [1] is a special case of our framework where the trivial chain decomposition (the collection of all one-node chains) is used.
Remark 3.
Instead of storing the matrix {a i j } directly, one can just store the description of the chain decomposition, which can be embedded in the description of S by describing S as an ordered set with some special symbol to indicate the end of each chain, instead of an unordered set as usual. Since S is already the necessary information for any scheme (as the whole BE scheme), the public storage overhead due to this matrix can be thus considered negligible.
Even better, if the chain decomposition admits a simple formula, we just store the description of that formula and let the index of the chain be ordered lexicographically. This is the case for our instantiations of SIC,LSIC (cf. Eqs. (5), (6)).
Non-trapdoor RSA Based Instantiation for SIC, LSIC
Instantiating SIC, LSIC.
We will state the result for LSIC so that the result for SIC can be obtained by setting k = 1. It suffices to define a chain decomposition of S LSIC[k] and the concrete scheme will follow automatically. We choose a chain decomposition
was also a chain decomposition). A concrete example for (SIC) acc is shown in Fig. 5 for n = 8. As an example, the subset key k(567) = s 
Corollary 11. We have that
MC acc C LSIC[k] = O(kn 1/k log 2 n), PC acc C LSIC[k] = O(log 5 n).
Scheme (LSIC[k])
acc has computational cost O(max {kn 1/k log 2 n, log 5 n}). For trillion users (n = 10 12 ), choose k as low as 4 we have 4n 1/4 log 2 n < log 5 n so that the computational cost is dominant by the latter, which is roughly as in Asano's scheme (but ours enjoy exceptionally lower header size). 
, which is much worse than ours, O(log 5 n). Moreover, this cost always dominates over the optimal MC for LSIC, O(n 1/k log 2 n). Framework Idea. The framework in this section is applicable to a class of posets that we call tree-stratifiable posets. Informally, such a poset of this type is defined as one which can be considered as formed by a tree hierarchy of atomic posets (not necessarily homogeneous), as shown in Fig. 6 . There, the graph decomposition G = {G x , G y , G z , ...} is said to form a hierarchy represented by tree H where V(H) = {x, y, z, ...}. Intuitively, such a graph decomposition is said to form a hierarchy if all the inclusion relations from every node in a lower subgraph (one with a lower index in the hierarchy), say G y in the figure, to the next upper one in the hierarchy, G x , are via a unique minimal node in that upper subgraph. Denote this minimal node as M G y . We will put a "dummy node" in each subgraph so that it will be the "representative" of that poset to reach that unique minimal node in the upper poset. (In the figure, the dummy node is D G y for subgraph G y to reach M G y ).
The idea for key derivations are as follows. First we define the key for each node in the highest sub-poset in the hierarchy by using the RSA-based framework in the last section. Recursively in a top-down fashion, we will define the set of keys corresponding to each lower subposet in the hierarchy. At some point, the set of keys for the nodes in G x are defined. Then we define the "dummy key" for the dummy node in a next lower level sub-poset by applying a random permutation perm (w.l.o.g we will use the reverse direction) to the key of the minimal element in that upper sub-poset that it connects, that is,
To define keys for the other nodes in this lower sub-poset (at G y ), we will again use the RSA-based framework for that sub-poset. However, this time the key for the dummy node has been already determined, while all the keys must agree with the relations of (G y ) acc , where G y is the modified subgraph that includes the dummy node, i.e., the relation of keys as defined in Eq. (7) instantiated to a poset that has G y as its representation. To solve this, it suffices to use the trapdoor of RSA. In this way, we can define keys recursively until reaching the lowest sub-posets. Users, on the other hand, do not have to use trapdoor since they only compute keys in the bottom-up fashion. Note that (perm, perm −1 ) is a public permutation, such as any block cipher with a fixed known key. We will model perm as an ideal random permutation in the security proof (the random permuation model).
The idea of reducing the whole poset by instantiating RSA-based framework in each sub-poset results in the use of only small number of primes for the overall scheme since the same set of primes can be used across different instantiations for different sub-posets.
To formalize this, we first define some more notations. 
Trapdoor RSA Accumulators.
A trapdoor RSA function generator G tRSA is the one that works exactly the same as G RSA but in addition also outputs the trapdoor td which is φ(η) where φ is the Euler's phi function. With td, given the description of f, any y ∈ U f , and a (multi-)set of accumulated values E, one can efficiently compute x ∈ U f such that f(x, E) = y. Denote such x by f td (y, E −1 ). Towards formalizing the construction, we "normalize" each sub-poset G ∈ G so that its base set will be B G = {1, ..., |V min (G )|} as follows. Construct γ :
by first picking an injective mapγ :
(the set of all images by γ from V(G )) be the set system with the base set B G .
The Construction (X)
tacc .
For simplicity we will consider homogeneously stratifiable poset, i.e., each S G is isomorphic to each other (in the sense that its corresponding DAG is isomorphic), say the set system Y. Let {a i j } 1≤i≤d,1≤ j≤m be a maximin matrix for set sys-tem Y, where d is the cardinality of its base set.
Keygen : Run a G tRSA to obtain a description of f : U f × E f → U f and trapdoor td. For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, pick an element p j ∈ E f . Let perm and perm −1 be a publicly available permutation mapping U f → U f . Let pub consist of all p j 's and {a i j }. Pick a random t ∈ U f . Define keys recursively in a top-down fashion in the tree H:
[Top]. At the subgraph G root ∈ G, where root is the root of H, by definition we have N = M G root . We let
[Intermediate]. At each atomic subgraph G ∈ G, the key k(M G ) is previously determined. Define the key for the dummy node:
. By using the trapdoor td and k(D G ), we solve Eq. (11) by setting S = D G (thus γ(S ) = B G ) to determine the secret s G , i.e.,
Then we define the key at each element in this subgraph, S ∈ V(G), as follows.
and for S ∈ V(G)),
[Bottom]. For each u ∈ N, we let p(u) = k({u}).
Derive : Compute from the relations given in Eqs. (9), (10), (11) but in the bottom-up fashion by using applications of f(·, ·), perm(·) starting from f(p(u), ·). Note that td is not required to do this.
Theorem 12. (X)
tacc is KINT-1-secure in the random permutation model (perm as an ideal random permutation), assuming the strong RSA assumption.
Proof. Let A be an adversary which breaks KINT-1 security of X tacc with probability . We present an algorithm F which breaks the dOW security of accumulators with equal probability (thus tight reduction). The construction is as follows:
Find Stage. First F find upon input the description desc f of accumulators from the challenger randomly chooses m elements from E f namely p 1 , ..., p m . (m is the number of columns of maximin matrix of the atomic set system composing X.) It then runs A which consequently output a challenge subset S * ∈ S X . F find has to provide the keys for users in N S * . Let B γ(S * ) = {i 1 , ..., i z }. It then just outputs to its challenger E k = {a i k j p j : 1 ≤ j ≤ m} for 1 ≤ k ≤ z, and waits for the result while goes to the next stage.
Guess Stage. The adversary F guess , upon a response f(x, E 1 ), ..., f(x, E z ) from the challenger, simulates the keys and also the random permutation oracle Perm/Perm −1 as follows. Denote the sub-poset which S * is in by G * . Beside user keys for the corrupted users in N S * , F guess will simulate also keys which are derivable from them so as to ensure the overall consistency in derivation. Such keys are those of S such that S S * ∅. We categorize to two kinds: (1) those in G * ; (2) those outside G * , which can be confined to those in sub-posets in the collection denoted G which includes all except sub-posets below U ∈ V min (G * ) such that U ⊆ S * .
Simulate Keys in (1): For each S ∈ V min (G * ) such that S S * ∅ (this implies S S * ) we let k(S ) = f(x, E k ) whereγ(S ) = i k . These keys are perfectly simulated since they are in the form of Equation (10) where s G * = x (which is unknown). For S ∈ V(G * ) such that S S * ∅, we have that there exists U ∈ V min (G * ) such that U S * and U ⊆ S , thus k(S ) can be derived from k(U) (which is previously defined only if U S * ) by using the relation from Eq. (10), (11) . Simulate Keys in (2): For each subgraph G ∈ G , F guess picks randomly s G ∈ U f and let the keys in this subposet be defined as in Equation (10), (11) . Give the user keys p(u) for all u ∈ N S * , which are simulated at the lowest sub-posets in the tree H, to A. Simulate Perm/Perm −1 : For each G ∈ G ∪{G * }, we define
and collect it to the list of input-output pairs of Perm. Note that s G * is unknown but the above right-hand-side value when G = G * can be computed from k(S ) for any S ∈ V(G * ) (which some are known). Queries to the random permutation oracle Perm/Perm −1 will be answered according to this list in both direction. When a query is not in the list, we just output a random string in U f (and make sure that it does not collide with some previous used strings) and record this to the list. The consistency of keys across sub-posets required from Equation (9) is ensured by this simulation which is perfect.
Consequently, A then outputs k(S * ). Now F guess just outputs (E * , w) = ({(max i∈γ(S * ) a i j ) p j : 1 ≤ j ≤ m}, k(S * )). If A wins its game then it must be that w = f(x, E * ). To see that F wins the game, we only have to show that This follows from the property of the maximin matrix that there is j such that max i∈γ(S * ) a i j < min i∈B γ(S * ) a i j . Consider the element p j , there are min i∈B γ(S * ) a i j such elements in the left-hand-side while only max i∈γ(S * ) a i j such elements in the right-hand-side. Therefore the uninclusion holds.
Remark 5. Instead of KINT-2 security as in the (X) acc scheme, we have proved the KINT-1 security for this the (X) tacc scheme since, intuitively, the difficulty arose if it were the KINT-2 game as the simulator cannot change the sub-poset where the problem instance is embedded, after the corruption. (Such an ability to change is required since we want S * to be in the sub-poset where the problem instance is embedded, but we do not know S * at the corruption phase). Nevertheless, if we indeed use the random selfreducibility of the accumulators (where the RSA ones have this property), the simulator can embed the problem instance at every sub-poset, and thus the KINT-2 security with tight reduction can be achieved, though. We omit the details here.
Characterizing Efficiency.
If the set system X of n users is tree-stratifiable homogeneously into a set system Y of d users with the tree H then 
where h H is the deepest depth of H. The first claim follows from the fact that a user has to compute Eq. (11) for at most h H times. The second claim is from the fact that we reuse the same set of primes across sub-posets. There is also the cost due to applications of perm, which is O(h H ), but this is suppressed by MC.
Generic Application.
We now confine our interest to the case where H is the balanced completed n 1/k -ary tree of depth h H = k. This forces the base sets of Y and X to have cardinality n 1/k and n respectively. In this case we say X = hier k (Y). The operation hier k is well-defined and can be thought as the converse direction of tree-stratification; thus, from any poset Z one can construct a tree-stratifiable poset, namely hier k (Z), by first scaling down the cardinality of the base set of Z to n 1/k . (Since usually any set system is originally defined in term of n). We write Z(n 1/k ) to emphasize the cardinality of base set. The point is that when k is a constant, Eq. (12) allows one to construct a full scheme of n users but with exactly the same asymptotic performances as those of (Z(n 1/k )) acc , which is a "scaled-down" scheme, in both parameters MC, PC! Moreover, if c Z(n) (n, r) = O(r) then we can show that c hier k (Z(n 1/k )) (n, r) = O(kr) = O(r) (by exactly the same proof as that of Theorem 2); therefore, HeaderSize is also unaffected. (In fact, for the case SIC(a), the maximum number of primes used per user is log a + 1, a small constant). From these and from Eq. (12), we have the corollary statement.
Concluding Remarks
We presented three generic frameworks for constructing broadcast encryption and give some efficient instantiations. Almost all subset-cover broadcast encryption schemes based on PRSG (or one-way function) or RSA accumulator in the literature can be rewritten as instantiations in our paradigms. In fact, [4] , [15] , [17] , [20] , [22] , [23] , [26] can be viewed as PRSG-instantiated schemes and [2] , [3] , [14] are non-trapdoor-RSA-instantiated schemes from our frameworks. The whole paradigm abstracts away the computational security issues and reduces the problem to only pure combinatorics. We leave as an open problem the question of showing any combinatorial bound from the efficiency characterization in each sub-framework. Note that the previous bounds for broadcast encryption [21] are done in the setting where no key derivation is involved.
